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Do we matter in the cosmos?
From the universe's point of view, humans are no
more than a microscopic blip. But does that mean
we are insigniﬁcant?
Nick Hughes
Humanity occupies a very small place in an unfathomably vast Universe. Travelling at
the speed of light – 671 million miles per hour – it would take us 100,000 years to
cross the Milky Way. But we still wouldn’t have gone very far. By recent estimates, the
Milky Way is just one of 2 trillion galaxies in the observable Universe, and the region
of space that they occupy spans at least 90 billion light-years. If you imagine Earth
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shrunk down to the size of a single grain of sand, and you imagine the size of that
grain of sand relative to the entirety of the Sahara Desert, you are still nowhere near to
comprehending how inﬁnitesimally small a position we occupy in space.  e
American astronomer Carl Sagan put the point vividly in 1994 when discussing the
famous ‘Pale Blue Dot’ photograph taken by Voyager 1. Our planet, he said, is nothing
more than ‘a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam’.
And that’s just the spatial dimension.  e observable Universe has existed for around
13.8 billion years. If we shrink that span of time down to a single year, with the Big
Bang occurring at midnight on 1 January, the ﬁrst Homo sapiens made an appearance
only at around 22:24 on 31 December. It’s now 23:59:59, as it has been for the past
438 years, and at the rate we’re going it’s entirely possible that we’ll be gone before
midnight strikes again.  e Universe, on the other hand, might well continue existing
forever, for all we know. Sagan could have added, then, that our time on this mote of
dust will amount to nothing more than a blip. In the grand scheme of things we are
very, very small.
For Sagan, the Pale Blue Dot underscores our responsibility to treat one another with
kindness and compassion. But reﬂection on the vastness of the Universe and our
physical and temporal smallness within it often takes on an altogether darker hue. If
the Universe is so large, and we are so small and so ﬂeeting, doesn’t it follow that we
are utterly insigniﬁcant and inconsequential?  is thought can be a spur to nihilism.
If we are so insigniﬁcant, if our existence is so trivial, how could anything we do or are
– our successes and failures, our anxiety and sadness and joy, all our busy ambition
and toil and endeavour, all that makes up the material of our lives – how could any of
that possibly matter? To think of one’s place in the cosmos, as the American
philosopher Susan Wolf puts
<http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil150/Wolf.pdf> it in ‘ e Meanings of
Life’ (2007), is ‘to recognise the possibility of a perspective … from which one’s life is
merely gratuitous’.
 e sense that we are somehow insigniﬁcant seems to be widely felt.  e American
author John Updike expressed it in 1985 when he wrote of modern science that:
We shrink from what it has to tell us of our perilous and insigniﬁcant place
in the cosmos … our century’s revelations of unthinkable largeness and
unimaginable smallness, of abysmal stretches of geological time when we
were nothing, of supernumerary galaxies … of a kind of mad mathematical
violence at the heart of the matter have scorched us deeper than we know.
In a similar vein, the French philosopher Blaise Pascal wrote in Pensées (1669):
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When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in an eternity
before and after, the little space I ﬁll engulfed in the inﬁnite immensity of
spaces whereof I know nothing, and which know nothing of me, I am
terriﬁed.  e eternal silence of these inﬁnite spaces frightens me.
Commenting on this passage in Between Man and Man (1947), the Jewish philosopher
Martin Buber said that Pascal had experienced the ‘uncanniness of the heavens’, and
thereby came to know ‘man’s limitation, his inadequacy, the casualness of his
existence’. In the ﬁlm Monty Python’s  e Meaning of Life (1983), John Cleese and Eric
Idle conspire to persuade a character, played by Terry Gilliam, to give up her liver for
donation. Understandably reluctant, as she is still very much using that particular
organ, she is nonetheless eventually won over by a song that sharply details just how
comically inconsequential she is in the cosmic frame.
Even the relatively upbeat Sagan wasn’t, in fact, immune to the pessimistic point of
view. As well as viewing it as a lesson in the need for collective goodwill, he also
argued that the Pale Blue Dot challenges ‘our posturings, our imagined self-
importance, and the delusion that we have some privileged position in the Universe’.
he pessimistic view, then, is that, because we occupy such a small and brief place
in the cosmos, we and the things we do are insigniﬁcant and inconsequential.
But is that right? Are we insigniﬁcant and inconsequential? And if we are, should we
respond with despair and nihilism?  ese questions are paradigmatically
philosophical, but they have received little attention from contemporary philosophers.
To the extent that they address the question of whether we are cosmically
insigniﬁcant at all, they have typically dismissed it as confused.
 e English moral philosopher Bernard Williams is representative of the dismissers.
As he understands it, having signiﬁcance from the cosmic point of view is the same
thing as having objective value. Something has objective value when it is not only
valuable to some person or other, but valuable independently of whether anyone
judges it to be so – valuable, Williams might say, from a universal perspective. By
contrast, something can be subjectively valuable even if it is not objectively valuable.
Provided that someone ﬁnds a thing valuable, then it has subjective value to them,
though not necessarily to the rest of us. Williams takes it to be a consequence of a
naturalistic, atheistic worldview that nothing has objective value. In his posthumous
essay ‘ e Human Prejudice’ (2006), he argues
<http://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/WILLIAMS.pdf> that the only kind of value
that exists is the subjective kind. I value Mozart’s Requiem. Maybe you do too. But
even so, Williams would say, it is valuable only insofar as we judge it to be. Its value is
T
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not an independent fact lying out there, beyond the reach of our opinions, waiting to
be uncovered.
Since, according to Williams, to be signiﬁcant from the cosmic point of view is to be
objectively valuable, and there is no such thing as objective value, it follows that there
is no such thing as cosmic signiﬁcance.  e very idea, he argues, is ‘a relic of a world
not yet thoroughly disenchanted’. In other words, of a world that still believes in the
existence of God. Once we recognise that there is no such thing, he says, there is ‘no
other point of view except ours in which our activities can have or lack a signiﬁcance’.
 e question of what is signiﬁcant from the point of view of the cosmos is incoherent:
one might as well ask what is signiﬁcant from the point of view of a pile of rocks.  e
philosopher Simon Blackburn at the University of Cambridge puts it even more
bluntly in Being Good (2001). When we ask if human life has meaning or signiﬁcance,
he simply responds: ‘To whom?’
Is the whole worry about cosmic insigniﬁcance nothing more than a muddle then?
Guy Kahane at the University of Oxford is one of the few contemporary philosophers
to have written about these issues in detail. He disagrees. If the naturalistic worldview
does indeed rule out the possibility of anything having objective value, he points out,
then it would still do so if the Universe were the size of a matchbox, or came into
existence only moments ago. If, on the other hand, there is such a thing as objective
value, then it would exist no less in an inﬁnitely large, old and silent universe. Matters
of cosmological size and scale don’t even come into the equation. In ‘Our Cosmic
Insigniﬁcance’ (2013), Kahane argues
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/nous.12030/asset/nous12030.pdf?
v=1&t=j3zor6s2&s=b505091839aca978828ed04636d44f0f67527804> that this is
obvious. But if so, is it really plausible that we are making such an elementary error?
Or is it more likely that there is something else driving our sense of cosmic
insigniﬁcance?
If we are the sole exemplars of intelligent life, then we are of
immense cosmic signiﬁcance
Kahane thinks that there is a better way of thinking about the matter. He disputes
Williams’s claim that nothing has objective value: intelligent life, he thinks, has it in
spades (and little else comes close). But more importantly, the dismissers have
misunderstood what it means for something to be signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant. Kahane
argues that the signiﬁcance of something is the product of two things: how valuable
(or disvaluable) it is, but also how worthy it is of attention. As he points out, when
one’s frame of reference expands to encompass more and more, the attention-
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worthiness of something within it, and so that thing’s signiﬁcance within the frame of
reference, tends to decrease. What’s signiﬁcant from the point of view of your life –
the birth of your child, perhaps – might be less signiﬁcant, less noteworthy, from the
point of view of the town you live in. And what’s signiﬁcant from the point of view of
the town you live in – the closure of the local hospital, let’s say – might be relatively
insigniﬁcant from the point of view of the entire country. What’s signiﬁcant from the
point of view of the country could, in turn, merit little attention from the point of view
of the entire world.
 e cosmic point of view encompasses literally everything in the Universe: the
entirety of space and time, from edge to edge, and beginning to end. From that point
of view, we are nothing more than a microscopic blip, physically and temporally
speaking at least. And this, Kahane argues, is what gives rise to our sense of
insigniﬁcance. Since the cosmic point of view encompasses so much, and the
signiﬁcance of things tends to diminish as the frame of reference expands, it is natural
to think that we couldn’t possibly stand out as worthy of special attention within it;
there is simply too much to compete with. If not, we conclude, then we must be
insigniﬁcant.
But, Kahane argues, this is all too quick. We mustn’t forget that signiﬁcance is also a
function of value. If, for some reason, human life stands out as a source of value
compared with everything else, then even from the cosmic point of view we might be
signiﬁcant. A single diamond sitting on display in a huge empty warehouse might be
small by comparison with its surroundings, but that doesn’t mean that it’s
insigniﬁcant or that it merits no attention. Since, Kahane argues, the primary source
of value is intelligent life, it follows that our cosmic signiﬁcance depends on how
much intelligent life there is out there. If the Universe is teeming with it, if we are just
one diamond among millions or billions of others, many of which are just as large and
bright, or more so, then we are indeed cosmically insigniﬁcant. If, however, we are the
sole exemplars of intelligent life, then we are of immense cosmic signiﬁcance: we are a
single diamond shining forth, surrounded by nothingness, like an incandescent
beacon of light in the Stygian night.  e rub, of course, is that we currently cannot
tell: we don’t know what, or rather who, we share the cosmos with.
Kahane’s view, then, is that intelligent life is the primary source of value, and since
only that which has value is signiﬁcant, whether or not we matter depends on the
quantity of intelligent life in the Universe. If it is abundant, then we are insigniﬁcant
and matter little. But if we alone exemplify it, then we are of immense signiﬁcance
even from the supremely broad perspective of the entire Universe.
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s that right? I think that, like Williams and the dismissers, Kahane has misdiagnosed
the issue. It is a striking fact that none of the passages quoted earlier expressing
the idea that we are cosmically insigniﬁcant makes any reference to the possibility
that we are only one among many communities of intelligent life spread
throughout the Universe. If that was the crux of the matter, wouldn’t we at least
expect it to be mentioned? In fact, wouldn’t we expect it to be front and centre? Yet it
is nowhere. Not in the passages quoted, nor, as far as I know, anywhere else. Instead,
what we ﬁnd are evocative descriptions of the minute location we occupy in space and
the disheartening brevity of our temporal span. Worse still, when considering the
possibilities that Kahane describes for our signiﬁcance, it is easy to remain unmoved.
Speaking for myself, insofar as reﬂection on our tiny place in the Universe leads me to
the feeling that we are unimportant and that nothing we do matters, that feeling
remains unwavering whether or not I imagine a universe full of life, or a vast barren
wasteland. In fact, if anything, things get worse when I contemplate the second
possibility. I suspect I am not alone in feeling this way.
A better diagnosis might be that when we reﬂect on our place in the Universe we ﬁnd
ourselves wanting on an altogether diﬀerent scale of signiﬁcance. To see what I have
in mind, notice that something can be signiﬁcant while being neither valuable nor
disvaluable. Suppose that a group of meteorologists is trying to establish whether a
rapidly developing tropical storm will turn into a hurricane before it hits land.  ere
is, it transpires, a large body of moist warm air 50 miles oﬀshore, into which the storm
will shortly collide. Moist warm air tends to intensify tropical storms. As a result, upon
learning of its presence, the meteorologists conclude that the storm will indeed turn
into a hurricane.  is, let’s suppose, is exactly what happens. When explaining events
to the public, it would be perfectly natural for the meteorologists to say that the
formation of the body of air was signiﬁcant in the chain of events that led to the storm
turning into a hurricane. But there need not be any suggestion of value or disvalue
here.  e body of air, and, we may suppose, the hurricane itself, had no positive or
negative value whatsoever. Only that which aﬀects intelligent life has value or disvalue
– or at least, only that which aﬀects sentient life, if we want to include other species –
and the land where the hurricane hit was wholly unpopulated; no human or animal
concerns were aﬀected.  e body of air was signiﬁcant, yet it doesn’t register
anywhere on the value scale.
In what sense was it signiﬁcant then?  e obvious answer is that it was causally
signiﬁcant by virtue of being one of the main causes of the storm turning into a
hurricane. Clearly, causal signiﬁcance needn’t involve value.  e causal signiﬁcance of
something is the result of the degree of inﬂuence it has within a causal chain.  e
more inﬂuence it has, the more signiﬁcant it is.  e less inﬂuence it has, the less
I
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signiﬁcant it is.  e presence of moist warm air oﬀshore was signiﬁcant because it
played an important role in the tropical storm developing into a hurricane. Perhaps,
unrelatedly, a forest ﬁre started on the other side of the world at the same time. If so,
that fact was not signiﬁcant – at least for the meteorologists – since it made no
diﬀerence whatsoever to the chain of events that they were interested in.
I think that, contra Kahane, it is a sense of causal, rather than value, insigniﬁcance that
is central to the sense that we are cosmically insigniﬁcant. Recognition of the tiny
place we occupy in the Universe throws a stark light on our distinct lack of causal
power.  ose of us who are thoroughly disenchanted know that almost all of space is
completely beyond our control, and that, living on no more than a mote of dust, we
will be borne away by the slightest breeze that happens to drift our way. Worse still,
we know that once we have been snuﬀed out, the Universe will continue to roll on as
though nothing had happened. Causally speaking, we really are insigniﬁcant from the
point of view of the whole Universe.
But why think that it’s the comprehension of our causal insigniﬁcance that drives the
pessimistic line of thought? Well, for one thing, it makes sense of the fact that our
sense of insigniﬁcance can easily remain unshaken upon considering the possibility
that we are alone in the Universe. Whether the Universe is teeming with intelligent
life, or almost wholly barren, makes no diﬀerence whatsoever to our degree of causal
inﬂuence within it. But more importantly, the primary source of our concern
regarding our cosmic insigniﬁcance is, it seems, that we occupy a very small place in
the Universe. Given this, it presumably makes sense to think that, were we not so
small, we would correspondingly not feel so insigniﬁcant.
Suppose that we could bend and warp the course of the
Universe: we’d feel rather pleased with ourselves
 e causal-powers explanation (as we might call it) makes sense of this. Holding ﬁxed
our causal powers as they actually are, the smaller the Universe is, the greater our size
and the degree of our causal inﬂuence within it; and the larger the Universe, the
smaller our size and the lesser our degree of causal inﬂuence.  is might explain why
the sense that we are cosmically insigniﬁcant is a largely modern phenomenon. With
a few exceptions, most of our predecessors had no inkling of the coming revelations
of astronomy, and believed that the Earth was at the centre of a rather small universe.
 ere is little evidence that they felt insigniﬁcant in the way that we are liable to. If the
causal-powers explanation is correct, this should come as no surprise: they might
have seen themselves as wielding a considerable degree of causal power.
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 e causal-powers explanation also makes sense of a related hypothetical scenario.
Suppose that, rather than imagining a situation in which our causal powers are held
ﬁxed and the size of the Universe is altered, we instead hold ﬁxed the size of the
Universe as it actually is, and instead imaginatively alter our causal powers. Suppose,
then, that we were to have control over the trajectory of distant stars, and the future of
far-ﬂung galaxies; that we could bend and warp the course of the Universe to ﬁt our
purposes, and so on. Would we still feel cosmically insigniﬁcant? I doubt it. Probably,
we would feel rather pleased with ourselves.
 e causal-powers explanation could also explain at least some of the appeal of
theism. Religious believers sometimes say that their faith gives signiﬁcance to their
lives, and fear that a life without God would be meaningless. One way in which this
might seem to be true – though presumably this is not all they have in mind – is that
through allegiance to a supremely powerful being they are able to share in its power.
If it worked, prayer would open the door to the possibility of causal powers far out-
stripping those we can eﬀect in the corporeal realm.
Still, for the disenchanted, it is hard to deny that our causal powers are insigniﬁcant
from the point of view of the entire Universe. But should we be troubled by this?
Should it lead us to nihilism and despair? I don’t think so. To see why, we need to go
back to the issue of value and draw another distinction. Some of the things that we
care about – happiness and human ﬂourishing, for example – are intrinsically
valuable to us.  at is to say, we ﬁnd them to be valuable in themselves.  at doesn’t
necessarily mean that they’re objectively valuable. Maybe they are, maybe they’re not
(we need not go along with Williams and Kahane in taking a stand on that matter).
What it does mean, however, is that we value them for their own sake. But not
everything that has value is intrinsically valuable. Some things are only instrumentally
valuable – valuable only as a means to an end. Cash, for example, doesn’t have any
intrinsic value – it’s just paper with ink printed on it – but it is instrumentally
valuable, since you can use it to acquire other things of value. Perhaps not happiness,
if the cliché is to be believed, but comfort at least.
We tend to treat power as though it is intrinsically valuable. We seek it out and covet
it, quite irrespective of how we might wield it and what it might get us. One need only
look at the history of totalitarian politics to recognise this tendency in its most
grotesque form. But power isn’t intrinsically valuable, it’s only instrumentally valuable
– valuable as a means to an end. And whether or not they are objectively valuable, the
ends that matter to us, the things that we care about most – our relationships, our
projects and goals, our shared experiences, social justice, the pursuit of knowledge,
the creation and appreciation of art, music and literature, and the future and fate of
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ours and other species – do not depend to any considerable extent on our having
control over a vast but largely irrelevant Universe. We might be distinctly lacking in
power from the cosmic perspective, and so, in a sense, insigniﬁcant. But having such
power and such signiﬁcance wouldn’t make much of a diﬀerence anyway. To lament
its lack and respond with despair and nihilism is merely a form of narcissism. Most of
what matters to us is right here on Earth.
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